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For decades the world’s agricultural markets have been highly distorted by national 
government policies, but very differently for different commodities such that a ranking of 
weighted average nominal rates of assistance across countries can be misleading as an 
indicator of the trade or welfare effects of policies affecting global markets. This article 
develops a new set of more-satisfactory indicators, drawing on the recent literature on 
trade restrictiveness indexes. It then estimates those two indicators for each of 28 key 
agricultural commodities from 1960 to 2004, based on a sample of 75 countries that 
together account for more than three-quarters of the world’s production of those 
agricultural commodities.  
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How Do Agricultural Policy Restrictions to Global  
Trade and Welfare Differ across Commodities? 
 
To compare agricultural distortions across countries, it is common to calculate weighted 
averages of nominal rates of assistance (NRAs) or consumer tax equivalents (CTEs) of 
those policies for key products. Those national averages vary considerably, and tend to be 
high for high-income countries (OECD 2008) and lower or even negative for developing 
countries (Krueger, Schiff and Valdes 1988). NRAs also vary greatly across commodities. 
Unsubsidized exporters of a particular product are keen to know by how much global 
trade in that product has been reduced by other countries’ policies, for that influences the 
amount of effort they are willing to expend in getting together with similar countries to 
seek more liberalization via trade negotiations. Governments and market participants 
have an interest also in understanding how distortions vary over time through each 
commodity cycle, particularly so they can anticipate what might happen when 
international prices spike up or down. 
However, neither the NRA nor the CTE global average is a good indicator of the 
global trade or welfare effects of policy interventions affecting a particular commodity 
market, for at least two reasons. First, the fact that there is international trade means each 
product’s production weight differs from its consumption weight for each country and so 
the global average NRA for any farm product will not be identical to its global average 
CTE. This will hold even if there were no behind-the-border tax or subsidy policies 3 
 
driving a wedge between the producer and consumer domestic prices. Hence neither can 
be a true indicator of the global trade effect of distortionary policies. Second, the welfare 
effect of a policy such as an import tariff is related to the square of that tariff rate, unlike 
the trade effect which is related just to the rate itself.  
Certainly a global modeller in possession of a particular commodity market (or of 
a global economy wide computable general equilibrium (CGE) model) could insert NRA 
and CTE estimates and generate partial (or general) equilibrium estimates of the global 
trade and welfare effects of those distortionary policies in the year for which the model’s 
data are calibrated. However, reliable global models do not exist for many commodities, 
global CGE models typically have to aggregate many of the smaller commodities into 
groups to keep the model tractable, and both types of model depend on scant econometric 
estimates of price elasticities. Moreover, such models are calibrated to a particular year 
and do not provide a long time series of estimates of the global trade and welfare effects 
of distortionary policies affecting particular commodity markets.  
Pending the improvement of that modelling situation, the purpose of the present 
article is to develop an alternative pair of indicators whose estimation requires no more 
data than that needed to estimate global NRAs and CTEs but which provide a far more 
precise indication of the trade or welfare effects of global distortions to particular product 
markets. To do so we draw on the recently developed literature on the family of trade 
restrictiveness indexes. That literature focuses mostly on policy distortions to imports, but 
we focus also on policies that distort exports (since the latter are still prevalent in a 4 
 
number of agricultural markets) and policies that drive a wedge between domestic 
producer and consumer prices.  
The first of the new indexes is the ad valorem trade tax rate which, if applied 
uniformly to a commodity in every country would generate the same reduction in trade as 
the actual cross-country structure of NRAs and CTEs for that commodity. The second of 
the new indexes refers to the partial equilibrium global welfare cost of that same structure 
of NRAs and CTEs: it is the ad valorem trade tax rate which, if applied uniformly to that 
commodity in every country would generate the same reduction in global economic 
welfare as the actual NRA/CTE structure across countries. 
To distinguish the indexes from indexes developed previously, we label these 
indexes the global trade reduction index (GTRI) and the global welfare reduction index 
(GWRI). We show that, if one is willing to assume that the domestic cross-price 
elasticities are zero and that own-price elasticities of supply are equal across countries for 
a particular commodity, and likewise for the own-price elasticities of demand for that 
commodity – as indeed some global commodity modellers do, for lack of country-
specific econometric estimates – then there is no need to know the size of those 
elasticities in order to estimate our GTRI and GWRI.  
The next section of the article develops the theory of these indexes. We then 
exploit recently compiled NRA and CTE estimates in the World Bank’s global 
Agricultural Distortion database to generate estimates of these two new indicators for 
each of 28 key agricultural commodities over the past half century, based on NRA and 5 
 
CTE estimates for a sample of 75 countries. The sensitivity of those estimates to our 
elasticity assumptions are then tested, before offering concluding observations in the final 
section.  
 
Defining our trade and welfare reduction indexes  
There is a growing theoretical literature that identifies ways to measure the welfare- and 
trade-reducing effects of international trade policy in scalar index numbers. This 
literature overcomes aggregation problems (across different forms of policy, and across 
products or countries) by using a theoretically sound aggregation procedure that answers 
precise questions regarding the trade and welfare reductions imposed by each country’s 
agricultural price and trade policies. The literature has developed considerably over the 
past two decades, particularly with the theoretical advances by Anderson and Neary 
(summarized in and extended beyond their 2005 book) and the partial equilibrium 
simplifications by Feenstra (1995).  
Notwithstanding these advances, few estimates of such indexes across countries 
or commodities have yet been published. A prominent exception is the work of Kee, 
Nicita and Olarreaga (2008, 2009) who, following the approach of Feenstra, estimate a 
series for developing and developed countries. However, they provide estimates across 
commodities for individual countries and only for a snapshot in time (the mid-2000s), 
and their estimates are based only on import barriers. An early country-specific study is 
an application to Mexican agriculture in the late 1980s (Anderson, Bannister and Neary 6 
 
1995). Perhaps further applications have not been forthcoming because to date that has 
required the same price elasticity estimates that are needed for formal supply-demand 
models.  
The indexes we estimate for individual commodities are well grounded in this 
same theory: they belong to the family of indexes first developed by Anderson and Neary 
(2005) under their catch-all name of trade restrictiveness indexes. As mentioned above, 
we label our indicators with terms that are more precise descriptors for the two indexes: a 
global trade reduction index and a global welfare reduction index.
1 They are computed 
from sub-indexes of the NRA and CTE for each commodity. While they are partial rather 
than general equilibrium measures,
2 they have the advantage of being more 
comprehensive in terms of instrument coverage (as needed when dealing with agricultural 
policies). They are developed for each commodity market, first for the import-competing 
countries and then for exporting countries. 
 
The import-competing countries 
We consider a particular good and assume it is imported into many small open 
economies that produce the good in a competitive market. However, the individual 
country markets for this importable good may be distorted by a tariff and/or other non-
tariff border measures and/or behind-the-border measures such as domestic producer or 
consumer taxes or subsidies or quantitative price controls. The effect of those 
countries’ policy-induced price distortions on global imports of the commodity is 7 
 
captured in our GTRI. This is defined as the uniform import tariff rate which, if applied 
to all countries in place of all actual price distortions, would result in the same 
reduction in the volume of imports as has resulted from the actual distortions.     
  Consider the market for one good, good i, which is affected in producing and/or 
consuming countries (j = 1…n) by a combination of policy measures that distort the 
consumer and producer prices of that good. For the producers of the good, the distorted 
domestic producer price in each country, 
P
ij p , is related to the world price, pi
*, by the 
relation, 
P
ij p = pi
*(1 + sij ) where sij is the rate of distortion of the producer price in 
proportional terms. For the consumers of the good, the distorted domestic consumer 
price, 
C
ij p , is related to the world price by the relation, 
C
ij p   = pi
*(1 + rij ) where rij is the 
rate of distortion of the consumer price in proportional terms. In general, rij ≠ sij . Using 
these relations, the change in imports in the market for good i in country j is given by: 
  ij i ij i ij y p x p M Δ − Δ = Δ
* *  
(1)
                ij
P
ij ij i ij
C
ij ij i s dp dy p r dp dx p / /
2 * 2 * − =         
where the quantities of good i demanded and supplied in country j, xij
 
and yij, are 
assumed to be functions of own domestic price alone:  ) (
C
ij ij ij p x x = and  ) (
P
ij ij ij p y y = , 
respectively. The neglect of cross-price effects, among other things, makes the analysis 
partial equilibrium.  8 
 
Strictly speaking, this result holds only for small distortions. In reality rates of 
distortion are not small. If, however, the demand and supply functions are linear, the 
reduction in imports is given by equation 1 with 
C
ij ij dp dx /  and 
P
ij ij dp dy /  equal to 
constants. If the functions are not linear, this expression provides an approximation to 
the loss. 
With n import-competing countries that together are small in the global market 
for good i and each subject to different levels of distortions, the aggregate reduction in 
imports for good i, in the absence of cross-price effects, is given by:  
















2 * / /  
   However,  when  n countries together are no longer small in the global market for 
good i, this expression no longer holds, because the world price is now endogenous. In 
this case, in a partial-equilibrium setting, the aggregate reduction in imports in good i is 
given by equation 2 but with endogenously determined world prices (and therefore 
domestic prices and quantities) that would prevail when each import-competing 
country takes into account the distortion by each other import-competing country. In 
the remainder of this section, we denote with a 
~  those prices and quantities that result 
once each import-competing country has taken into account the distortion in each other 
import-competing country. In our empirical work below (which incorporates exporting 
countries into the analysis) to compute the GTRI, we use real world observed prices 9 
 
and quantities — which are those that prevail when summing over n countries that 
together are not small in the global market for good i .  
Setting the result of equation 2 equal to the reduction in imports from a uniform 
tariff, Ti, we have:  





















2 * ~ / ~ ~ ~ / ~ ~ ~ / ~ ~
 
where  ij m ~ is the quantity of good i imported in country j, which is a function of the 
import-competing price,  ij p ~ .   
Solving for Ti, we get 
(4a)  } { i i i i i b S a R T + = ,  
where          
































ij ij i ij p d y d p p d y d p v ~ / ~ ~ / ~ / ~ ~ 2 * 2 *     
and    




ij ij i i p d m d p p d x d p a ~ / ~ ~ / ~ / ~ ~ 2 * 2 *





ij ij i i p d m d p p d y d p b ~ / ~ ~ / ~ / ~ ~ 2 * 2 *  
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    The GTRI can be regarded as a true index of average tariff rates across 
countries, since what is held constant is the value of imports in constant prices. Ri and 
Si are indices of global average consumer and producer price distortions. They are 
arithmetic means across countries. Evidently, Ti can be written as a weighted average 
of the levels of distortion of consumer and producer prices. An important advantage of 
using this decomposition of the index into producer and consumer effects is that it 
treats correctly the effects of non-tariff measures and domestic distortions. We can deal 
with, and analyse, the production and consumption sides of the product market 
separately.   
In equations 4b and 4c, the weights for each commodity are proportional to each 
country’s marginal response of domestic production (or consumption) to changes in 
international free-trade prices. It might be convenient to write these weights as functions 
of, among other things, the domestic price elasticities (at the protected trade situation) of 
supply and demand ( ij σ  and  ij ρ , respectively):  
(5)   ∑ =
n
j
ij i ij ij i ij ij x p x p u ) ~ ~ ( / ) ~ ~ (
* * ρ ρ    and   ∑ =
n
j
ij i ij ij i ij ij y p y p v ) ~ ~ ( / ) ~ ~ (
* * σ σ
 
In the absence of estimates of domestic demand and supply elasticities, if we 
assume domestic price elasticities of supply are equal across countries for a particular 
commodity, and similarly for the domestic price elasticities of demand for a particular 
commodity, the elasticities in the numerator and denominator of equation 5 cancel. 
Thus we can find Ri (S i) by aggregating the change in consumer (producer) prices 11 
 
across countries, using as weights the share of each country’s domestic value of 
consumption (production) at undistorted prices. We discuss the plausibility and 
implications of this elasticity assumption below.  
Estimating Ti in equation 4a also requires an assumption about the weights a and 
b (equation 4d). The weight a (b) is proportional to the ratio of the marginal response of 
domestic demand (supply) to a price change relative to the marginal response of imports 
to a price change. If we assume the marginal responses of supply and demand to a price 
change are the same in aggregate, then a=b=0.5.
3 
  Now we turn to the measure of the effect of a commodity’s distortions on global 
welfare, the GWRI. The derivation follows the same steps as in the derivation of the 
GTRI. The distortions in the market for good i in country j creates a welfare loss, Lij. In 
partial equilibrium terms, this loss is given by the sum of the change in producer plus 
consumer surplus net of the tariff revenue. The loss of producer and consumer surplus 
is given by: 
(6)  {}
C
ij ij ij i
P
ij ij ij i ij dp dx r p dp dy s p L / ) ( / ) (
2
1 2 * 2 * − =  
where the demand and the supply for good i in country j are again functions of own 
domestic price alone.   
Strictly speaking, this result too holds only for small distortions. With non-
trivial rates of distortion, the welfare losses are defined by the familiar triangular-
shaped dead-weight loss areas under the demand and supply curves for the good in a 12 
 
small open economy. These areas can be obtained by integration. If the demand and 
supply functions are linear, the welfare loss is given by equation 6 where 
C
ij ij dp dx /  and 
P
ij ij dp dy /  are constants. If the functions are not linear, this expression provides an 
approximation to the loss.  




ij p p p = = ), the expression 
reduces to:  
(7)  {} ij ij ij i ij dp dx t p L / ) (
2
1 2 * − =  
Equation 7 yields the fundamental result that the loss from a tariff is proportional to the 
square of the tariff rate. This holds because the tariff rate determines both the price 
adjustment and the quantity response to this adjustment (Harberger 1959).  If rij ≠ sij, 
the expression in equation 6 yields the result that the consumer and the producer losses 
are each proportional to the square of the rate of distortion of the consumer or producer 
price, respectively.   
   With  n countries (together small in the market for good i) applying different 
levels of distortions to good i, the welfare loss for the group of countries, in the absence 


























When n countries together are no longer small in the global market for good i, 
we need to take account of the change in world prices induced by each country taking 
into account the distortions in each other country. Equilibrium prices and quantities for 
the global market in good i are marked with a 
~  below.  
The uniform import tariff rate, Wi, that generates a global deadweight loss 
identical with that of the actual distortions of different countries for good i is 
determined by the following equation:  



















2 * ~ / ~ ) ~ ( ~ / ~ ) ~ ( ~ / ~ ) ~ (  
Solving for Wi, we have:  
(10a) 




























ij ij i v s S    
and uij, vij, ai and bi are as defined earlier.  
i R′ and  i S′ are measures of the average levels of consumer and producer price 
distortions, respectively. They are means of order two. The desired GWRI, Wi , is an 
appropriately weighted average of the levels of distortions of consumer and producer 
prices and so is also a mean of order two. As with the index Ti, we can deal thus with, and 
analyse, the production and consumption sides of the market separately.  14 
 
As noted, the weights in the construction  i R′ and  i S′ and Wi (in equation 10) are 
the same as the weights for Ri and Si and Ti (in equation 4) except that in the case of the 
GTRI we construct arithmetic means (which are the means of order one) whereas in the 
case of the GWRI we construct means of order two. This difference is due to the fact that 
the losses of import volume in each country are all proportional to the distortion rate 
whereas the losses of welfare are proportional to the squares of the distortions rates 
(compare equation 1 with equation 6).  
 
Adding the exporting countries 
The indexes can each be written also for countries exporting good i. In an exporting 
country, an export subsidy reduces welfare in the same way as an import tax in the 
import-competing sector, but it increases trade whereas the tariff reduces trade. As such, 
we keep separate track of import-competing and exporting countries for the purpose of 
estimating the GWRI and GTRI. This is done by extending the country set and dealing 
separately with import-competing countries (hereafter countries 1 to n) and exporting 
countries (hereafter countries n+1 to z).  
The GTRI for both importing and exporting countries can be written as an 
expansion of equation 4:  
(11a)  } ) ( ) {( i iCX iX iCM iM i iPX iX iPM iM i b S S a R R T ω ω ω ω + + + =                             15 
 
where ai and bi are as already defined,  iM R  and  iM S  are  i R and  i S  from equations 4b 





















ij ij iX v s S  
and the ω  expressions are shares of the value of production and consumption for 
import-competing and exporting countries in goods market i at endogenously 
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+ = = − = ω ω  .     
It can be seen that when including both importing and exporting countries, we 
continue to first aggregate for producers and consumers separately. Global producer and 
consumer distortions are aggregated in the last step with the assumption that the marginal 
responses of supply and demand to a price change are the same in aggregate (that is, ai = 
bi = 0.5). The aggregates in equation 11b are the weighted average levels of distortions to 
consumer and producer prices in the good i exporting countries, respectively, with 
weights uij and v ij given in equation 4b and 4c. Importantly, distortions to exporting 
countries enter equation 11b as negative values. This is because whilst a lowering of rij 16 
 
(the distortion of the consumer price of good i in country j) or sij (the distortion of the 
producer price of good i in country j) in the importing countries lowers the trade 
reduction index, a lowering of rij or sij in the exporting countries increases Ti .  
The resulting GTRI measure, Ti, can be regarded as the good i trade tax rate 
which, if applied uniformly across all countries, would give the same reduction in trade 
as the combinations of individual country measures distorting consumer and producer 
prices in the importing and exporting countries.  
The GWRI for import-competing and exporting countries can be written in the 
same form as 11a as an expansion on equation 10, where the Ri and Si terms are the 
mean of order two equivalents: 
(12)   
2 / 1 2 2 2 2 } ) ( ) {( i iCX iX iCM iM i iPX iX iPM iM i b S S a R R W ω ω ω ω ′ + ′ + ′ + ′ =  
These extensions of the GTRI and the GWRI to exporting countries have 
precisely the same properties as the indexes for the import-competing countries. GTRIs 
and GWRIs can be aggregated across product groups using as weights an average of the 
global commodity consumption and production at undistorted prices. Indexes for the 5-
year periods reported below are unweighted averages of the annual indexes.  
 
Decomposing the GTRI and GWRI  17 
 
It is possible to quantify the contribution of each country to the reduction in world trade 
or world welfare as measured by the GTRI or GWRI. The contribution, i C , of each 
country to the reduction in world imports for good i comes from the decomposition of 
the element in square brackets in equations 4b and 4c on the consumption and 
production sides of the economy, respectively. There are similar decompositions for 
exporting countries, albeit with the positive assistance measures entering as negative 
contribution shares (see equation 11) for Ti because positive assistance increases rather 
than reduces world trade.  
To bring together the import-competing and exportable sides of the market, we 
multiply the contributions by the overall share of imports or exports in the value of 
production (consumption) for each commodity:  
(13)  iPM ij ij
P
Mi v s C ω =   ,
          
) 1 ( iPM ij ij
P
Xi v s C ω − − =   
iCM ij ij
C
iM u r C ω =   ,
          
) 1 ( iCM ij ij
C
Xi u r C ω − − =  
For the GWRI, we use equation 10 to derive a similar decomposition from our 
data. The contributions are the same as equation 13 with the absolute value of the sij 
and rij terms entering as squared terms, because the GWRI is a mean of order two. To 
then find the overall contribution to the reduction in trade or welfare, we average the 
production and consumption contributions.  
 
The World Bank’s Agricultural Distortions database 18 
 
A new database generated by the World Bank’s Agricultural Distortions research 
project (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008), using a methodology summarized in 
Anderson et al. (2008), provides a timely opportunity to estimate GTRIs and GWRIs 
for individual commodity markets. The database contains consistent estimates of 
annual NRAs and CTEs at the commodity level, for a set of agricultural products 
(called covered products). These products account for around 70 percent of total 
agricultural production in 75 countries (called focus countries), which in turn account 
for 92 percent of global agricultural GDP. The data cover a time period between 1955 
and 2007 for the majority of countries, but the country coverage is most complete for 
the years 1960 to 2004 so only those are used here. Global NRAs and CTEs for various 
commodities are estimated using as weights the values of production and consumption, 
respectively, at undistorted prices. Appendix Tables 1 and 2 report those estimates for 
28 major products.  
The range of measures included in the Agricultural Distortions database NRA 
and CTE estimates is wide. By calculating domestic-to-border price ratios the estimates 
include the price effects of all tariff and non-tariff trade measures, plus any domestic 
price support measures (positive or negative), plus an adjustment for the output-price 
equivalent of direct interventions in farm input markets. Where multiple exchange rates 
operate, an estimate of the import or export tax equivalents of that distortion are 
included as well.    19 
 
An important feature of the World Bank dataset is that the reported prices and 
quantities are the endogenously determined equilibrium prices and quantities 
(represented by 
~  in the analysis above). This allows us to estimate GTRIs and GWRIs 
using observed data.  
 
Estimates of trade and welfare reduction indexes  
Table 1 reports our time series of estimated GTRIs for the 28 agricultural commodities, 
and for four aggregated groups of commodities (grains and tubers, oilseeds, tropical 
crops, and livestock products). Generally those GTRIs are somewhat above the NRAs 
and CTEs in Appendix Tables 1 and 2, and especially for tropical products where the 
trade-reducing effects of import taxes of some high-income countries are reinforced by 
the export taxes of some lower-income countries. By contrast, for some other products 
the global average GTRI is less than the NRA and CTE, reflecting the fact that export 
subsidies have been in place for some higher-income countries or import subsidies for 
some lower-income countries, which offset the trade-reducing effects of tariffs. In some 
cases (e.g., millet) there are even some five-year periods when the GTRI is negative, 
indicating that policies on net have encouraged international trade in those goods — 
which can be just as damaging to national and global economic welfare as  policies that 
discourage trade. 
The differences within the four groups of commodities in the extent to which 
their global trade has been taxed are considerable. Among the grains it is rice trade that 20 
 
has been taxed most since the 1970s, while among the oilseeds and tropical crops it is 
sesame and sugar trade, respectively, that are taxed most. Feedgrain and oilseed trade, 
especially the major items of maize and soybean, has been taxed least among those 
crops shown, and at very low rates compared with livestock products, especially milk. 
Note, however, that the extent of distortions to trade has diminished more for livestock 
products than for crops since the 1980s when agricultural price and trade reforms (as 
chronicled in Anderson 2009) began to be implemented in numerous countries. 
In table 2 the 2000-04 GTRI estimates are disaggregated to show their 
production and consumption components, from which three points are worth noting. 
First, the production and consumption components tend to be similar in magnitude, 
indicating that the main policy interventions are at the national borders of countries 
rather than behind-the-border domestic measures. Second, for those few products for 
which the GTRI is negative, indicating that there is still some use of explicit or implicit 
trade-expanding measures, the disaggregation reveals possible reasons. In the case of 
cotton it is coming predominantly from pro-trade production measures (such as have 
operated in the United States), whereas in the case of millet and groundnuts it is 
coming mostly from pro-trade consumption measures (such as import subsidies in 
Africa at desperate times of food shortages just prior to the next harvest, when regional 
prices of food staples are at their highest and well above the preceding season’s post-
harvest price). And third, the final two columns of Table 2 confirm that countries that 
are importers of a product assist their producers far more than countries that export that 
good. 21 
 
Tables 3 and 4 similarly report the GWRI estimates. These are all necessarily 
positive, given that they are means of order two measures. And they are substantially 
above the NRAs, with 5-year averages across the 28 commodities between 1960 and 
2004 in the range of 50 to 80 percent compared with the 9 to 27 percent range for the 
NRA averages. This greater size is partly because the welfare cost is proportional to the 
square of the NRA, and partly because some NRAs are negative and so offset positive 
NRAs in the process of averaging them whereas the welfare cost of those negative and 
positive NRAs are additive. The most distorted among the 28 commodities in 2000-04 
in terms of their global welfare cost are rice, sugar, milk, beef, poultry and cotton. 
Their and the other GWRIs for that period are shown in Figure 1, together with the 
(necessarily always lower) GTRIs.  
When disaggregating those GWRIs as in Table 4, it is again clear that the sub-
indicators differ little as between the production and consumption components, and that 
countries for which a product is an importable tend to be much greater contributors to 
the product’s GWRI than those countries for which it is an export item. The final two 
columns also reveal that, among the exporting countries shown, cotton is (equal) 
second only to milk in terms of the size of its GWRI, thanks to the huge cotton export 
subsidies in the United States and the cotton export taxes of several developing 
countries. 
Figures 2 and 3 present the country contributions to the global reduction in 
commodity market trade or welfare for the five most distorted farm products. The 22 
 
figures reveal that for some commodity markets such as rice, there are only a handful 
of countries whose policies are responsible for most of the global distortion, whereas 
for other commodities such as sugar and beef, a large number of countries’ policies 
contribute more evenly to the reduction in global trade and welfare. Note that the 
country rankings are different for the two indicators though. In the global rice market, 
for example, India is the main contributor to the distortion to the level of trade whereas 
Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam and Korea are much more significant contributors to the 
reduction in global welfare in the rice market. This arises because the effect on GWRI 
of the large NRAs and CTEs of the latter four countries swamp those for India.  
 
Sensitivity analysis 
In this section we consider some important caveats, because the paper’s two indexes 
have been calculated with the help of a number of simplifying assumptions. The most 
noteworthy are that each country’s own-price elasticity of supply (and also of demand) 
for a particular product is the same as that for every other country, and that cross-price 
elasticities are zero. It is not uncommon for modelers of the global market for particular 
farm products to adopt these assumptions, for want of reliable or agreed econometric 
estimates of those elasticities for each country (an early global example being Valdés 
and Zietz 1980). Even so, these price elasticity assumptions could introduce potential 
biases into our GTRI and GWRI index estimates, and in either direction. So too could 
our assumption for simplifying the aggregation of our global producer and consumer 23 
 
distortion indexes, namely, that the aggregate marginal response of domestic demand to 
a price change is the same as the aggregate marginal response of domestic supply for 
the world.  
To gauge the potential importance of not allowing differential price responses, 
we re-computed our two indexes using country- and commodity-specific own-price 
elasticity of supply and demand estimates available for 8 key farm products from a 
widely cited source (Tyers and Anderson 1992). In 2000-04 those 8 products accounted 
for 71 percent of the global value of production of the 28 products listed in the earlier 
tables. A comparison of those results, reported in Table 5, with those in Tables 1 and 3 
reveals little difference in the overall indications of distortions: the averages across the 
8 products using the elasticity estimates are 5 percentage points lower than our earlier 
estimates for one decade but between just 0 and 3 points lower for the other 7 decade 
averages shown. Not surprisingly the differences are largest for the product with the 
most diverse NRAs, namely rice, and are larger for the GTRIs than the GWRIs 
(because the GWRI is a mean of order two and so the weights play a less important role 
in the determination of its overall index). In all cases, though, the index trends over 
time are much the same under either set of elasticity assumptions.  
Sensitivity analysis was also undertaken with respect to the assumption that the 
aggregate marginal response of demand to a price change is the same as the aggregate 
marginal supply response for the world. We did so by re-computed our two indexes 
assuming that demand was instead twice, or half, as responsive as supply. Despite that 24 
 
wide range, the estimates were almost unchanged at the aggregate level across all 29 
products, and even the 5-year averages for each of the four product groups (grains, 
oilseeds, tropical crops and livestock) changed by no more than 2 percentage points. 
This benign result is due to the empirical fact that the producer and consumer 
distortions are similar, reflecting the dominance of border measures in the policy 
instrument mix.     
A third type of sensitivity analysis could be to assume non-zero cross-price 
elasticities. This is left as an area for further research for two reasons. One is because 
the cross-price elasticity estimates available from Tyers and Anderson (1992) for the 8 
products in Table 5 are at or near zero in most cases, and they would be very low also 
for the tropical perennial crop products listed in the earlier tables. Hence we do not 
expect it would alter the index estimates very much. The other reason is that the above 
algebra becomes much more complex once this simplifying assumption is dropped, in 
which case the analyst may as well move to a formal multi-commodity modeling 
framework for the subset of situations where this is considered important enough 
empirically. Meanwhile, as and when improved econometric estimates of price 
elasticity estimates become available for each country and commodity, more-accurate 




The above application of these two commodity-specific additions to the family of so-
called trade restrictiveness indexes provides very different and much larger indicators 
of distortions to global agricultural markets than standard NRAs and CTEs (and even 
more so than the OECD’s producer and consumer support estimates, which are 
expressed as a percentage of distorted rather than undistorted prices and so are smaller 
than their NRA and CTE counterparts). More specifically, the GTRI offers a much 
truer indication of the world trade effects of government interventions in the markets 
for particular traded products, by properly accommodating all domestic and border 
subsidies and taxes; and the GWRI offers a much truer indication of the global welfare 
effects of government interventions in the markets for traded products, by also properly 
taking into account the fact that the welfare cost of a price distortion is proportional to 
the square of the tax or subsidy rate.  
With the World Bank’s NRA/CTE database, which provides greater coverage in 
terms of commodities, countries and instruments than in any previous estimates of the 
extent of distortions of global agricultural markets, we have been able to reveal in 
which product markets the reduction in trade or the loss of welfare is greatest. These 
two indexes have an advantage over more-formal supply/demand models in that they 
can be expressed in time series form and thereby reveal trends and fluctuations over 
long periods, rather than just providing a snapshot at a point in time which is typical of 
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Figure 1. GTRIs and GWRIs for 28 major agricultural products, 2000-04 (percent) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NRA and CTE estimates in Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008). 29 
 
(a) Sugar  (b) Milk  (c) Rice  (d) Beef  (e) Cotton 
(51 countries,       
GTRI = 54.8) 
(46 countries,       
GTRI = 44.5) 
(36 countries,       
GTRI = 42.9) 
(47 countries,       
GTRI = 32.0) 
(19 countries,       
















































































Figure 2. Country Share of the Commodity-Specific GTRI for Rice, Sugar, Beef, Cotton and Milk, 2000–04 (percent) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NRA and CTE estimates in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
Notes: The decomposition over the 5-year period can be greater than or less than 100, even though the decomposition sums to 
100 in any one year. We have scaled the 5-year averages, so that the decompositions sum to 100 percent. Focus countries have 
been omitted from the above charts if their decomposition share has an absolute value of less than 2 percent. 30 
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Figure 3. Country Share of the Commodity-Specific GWRI for Rice, Sugar, Milk, Beef and Cotton, 2000–04 (percent) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NRA and CTE estimates in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
Note: The decomposition over the 5-year period can be greater than or less than 100, even though the decomposition sums to 
100 in any one year. We have scaled the 5-year averages, so that the decompositions sum to 100 percent. Focus countries have 
been omitted from the above charts if their decomposition share has an absolute value of less than 2 percent.31 
 
Table 1. Global Trade Reduction Indexes, by Commodity, 1960 to 2004 (percent) 
    1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
Grains and tubers  22 27 19 21 20 35 31 17 17
Rice  49 50 58 42 41 58 53 32 43
Wheat  13 13 -1 0 9 28 20 11  4
Maize  4 8 4 9 -3 9 10 2 3
Cassava  na na 23 0 8 15 10 13 10
Barley  36 31  3 -14 -1 36 32 10  4
Sorghum  117 55 65 42 15 24 9 18  6
Millet  67 66 29 1 -14 -31 -114  -32  -22
Oat  15 9  -8 -3 -10 -2 -2  13 9
Oilseeds  4 9 6 9 7 17 12 7 5
Soybean  0 1 0 6 8 11 8 6 6
Groundnut  24 17 49 33 16 38 -12 -7  -10
Palmoil  20 28 12 -5 -11 -1 14 13 -3
Rapeseed  -1 19  9 4 10 39 28  7 12
Sunflower  -8 -5  -10 -2 -12 36 21 15 13
Sesame  48 60 62 65 55 43 41 45 32
Tropical crops  28 45 19 28 30 34 28 24 25
Sugar  83  140 26 40 49 56 44 41 55
Cotton  9 2  13 14 1 13 4 9  -4
Coconut  29 24  8 3 12 21 35 23  9
Coffee  18 30 31 37 46 33 13 12  2
Rubber  30 33  7 19 21 17 14 -4 -3
Tea  35 36 27 26 23 22 23 20 17
Cocoa  27 40 39 53 45 30 26 27 33
Livestock products  36 37 34 46 54 49 31 26 24
Pigmeat  25 35 26 23 47 25 11  9  8
Milk  84 86 82 135 131 125 63 53 45
Beef  22 19 16 16 32 47 32 33 32
Poultry  21 20 27 24 24 27 27 18 18
Egg  -11 -7 -8 10 8 13 11 11  7
Sheepmeat  57 70 96 140 83 68 45 24 20
Wool  0 0  -6 -4 -7 -3 -4 0 0
All of the above 
 28 commodities  29 32 24 31 34 40 29 21 20
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NRA and CTE estimates in Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008). 32 
 



















Grains and tubers  17  14 19 0  40
Rice 43  42 44 -1  102
Wheat 4  2 7 2  6
Maize 3  -1 7 0  11
Cassava  10 10 9 10 0
Barley 4  3 5 0  28
Sorghum 6  3 9 0  14
Millet -22  0 -43 -22  0
Oat  9 15 3 7 6
Oilseeds 5  3 8 3  13
Soybean 6  2 10 2  18
Groundnut -10  -6 -14 24  -36
Palmoil -3  0 -7 -1  -13
Rapeseed 12  13 12 0  41
Sunflower  13 15 12 18 3
Sesame  32 39 26 32 0
Tropical crops  25  23 28 1  62
Sugar 55  52 58 -23  74
Cotton -4  -7 -1 -1  -14
Coconut 9  8 10 9  0
Coffee 2  0 4 2  0
Rubber -3  -4 -1 -3  0
Tea  17 12 21 17 0
Cocoa  33 35 31 33 0
Livestock products  24  24 24 -1  41
Pigmeat 8  9 7 -1  18
Milk 45  48 41 -21  53
Beef 32  29 35 7  45
Poultry 18  16 21 -1  57
Egg 7  5 9 0  16
Sheepmeat 20  19 21 4  33
Wool 0  0 0 0  12
All of the above 
 28 commodities  20  19 21 0  41
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NRA and CTE estimates in Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008). 33 
 
Table 3. Global Welfare Reduction Indexes, by Commodity, 1960 to 2004 (percent) 
    1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
       
Grains and tubers  44  48  45 51 50 94 87  63  61
Rice  66  65  86 75 75 150 152  116  141
Wheat  34  39  30 25 30 59 47  29  20
Maize  29  29  22 28 30 48 29  21  20
Cassava  na  na  23 9 11 16 10  14  10
Barley  52  49  35 41 32 97 87  45  33
Sorghum  137  89  90 76 52 56 54  39  39
Millet  68  66  34 21 32 59 126  73  31
Oat  52  72  63 105 41 67 70  33  31
Oilseeds  9  16  16 20 28 37 34  24  24
Soybean  4  6  10 16 28 31 27  24  25
Groundnut  29  27  52 41 38 50 50  43  43
Palmoil  21  29  36 22 23 26 55  28  15
Rapeseed  21  32  19 9 18 64 48  15  26
Sunflower  15  11  16 25 37 58 40  21  19
Sesame  48  60  62 65 56 44 47  45  38
Tropical crops  50  89  45 46 50 61 56  50  55
Sugar  149  222  54 66 75 100 76  77  87
Cotton  21  46  47 32 29 39 38  34  45
Coconut  29  24  12 14 19 24 38  27  12
Coffee  23  32  35 44 50 38 31  22  15
Rubber  37  39  19 25 25 20 21  26  11
Tea  43  41  32 41 39 36 35  32  30
Cocoa  28  47  42 58 51 38 36  36  38
Livestock products  74  76  69 84 84 84 66  53  50
Pigmeat  50  77  63 56 69 42 33  27  28
Milk  159  158  145 217 182 191 111  83  73
Beef  45  38  36 43 65 93 76  72  68
Poultry  37  34  46 43 48 48 54  46  45
Egg  45  41  31 19 21 39 36  36  26
Sheepmeat  95  129  160 192 123 107 75  41  31
Wool  0  0  6 7 11 7 10  8  6
All of the above 
 28 commodities  58  62  54 61 62 82 70  54  52
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NRA and CTE estimates in Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008). 34 
 



















Grains and tubers  61  60 62 16  91
Rice  141  139 142 20  215
Wheat  20  17 22 9  26
Maize  20  20 19 17  26
Cassava  10  10 9 10  0
Barley  33  31 35 10  85
Sorghum  39  39 38 35  30
Millet  31  7 43 31  0
Oat  31  41 14 25  28
Oilseeds  24  28 20 14  44
Soybean  25  29 19 14  51
Groundnut  43  43 43 32  48
Palmoil  15  10 18 16  13
Rapeseed  26  29 22 2  47
Sunflower  19  21 16 22  8
Sesame  38  41 35 38  0
Tropical crops  55  55 55 33  86
Sugar  87  87 87 47  95
Cotton  45  45 45 47  24
Coconut  12  12 12 12  0
Coffee  15  15 15 15  0
Rubber  11  13 8 11  0
Tea  30  29 32 30  0
Cocoa  38  39 36 38  0
Livestock products  50  49 50 15  66
Pigmeat  28  27 28 7  40
Milk  73  76 69 56  75
Beef  68  62 73 19  82
Poultry  45  44 47 13  76
Egg  26  25 27 16  36
Sheepmeat  31  30 31 22  36
Wool  6  8 4 6  22
All of the above 
 28 commodities  52  51 52 17  72
 Source: Authors’ calculations based on NRA and CTE estimates in Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008). 35 
 
Table 5: Sensitivity of Estimates of Global Trade and Welfare Reduction Indexes to Price Elasticity Estimates, 8 Major 
Agricultural Products, 1965 to 2004 (percent) 
GTRI, with elasticity estimates from Tyers and Anderson (1992) 
GWRI, with elasticity estimates from Tyers and 
Anderson (1992) 
   1965-74 1975-84 1985-94 1995-2004    1965-74 1975-84 1985-94 1995-2004 
Rice 44 31 38 27    66 59 113 102 
Wheat 9 6 33 7  35 30 64 27 
Maize 6 4 8 2  27 30 40 22 
Sugar 72 38 38 38  125 63 74 69 
Pigmeat 31 35 18 10  71 63 37 30 
Milk 80 131 94 52  148 194 155 86 
Beef 20 28 49 41  41 59 94 77 
Poultry 24 24 18 6    40 46 49 56 
Average, above products  31 36 37 22    62 66 80 59 
GTRI from Table 1, with simplifying elasticity assumption  GWRI from Table 3, with simplifying elasticity assumption 
   1965-74 1975-84 1985-94 1995-2004    1965-74 1975-84 1985-94 1995-2004 
Rice 54 42 56 38    76 75 151 128 
Wheat 6 4 24 7  35 28 53 24 
Maize 6 3 9 2  25 29 38 21 
Sugar 83 44 50 48  138 71 88 82 
Pigmeat 31 35 18 9  70 62 38 27 
Milk 84 133 94 49  152 200 151 78 
Beef 17 24 39 33  37 54 85 70 
Poultry 24 24 27 18    40 46 51 46 
Average, above products  32 38 39 24    63 69 85 59 
Difference in 8-product average of GTRI estimates  Difference in 8-product average of GWTRI estimates 
Percentage point difference  -1 -2 -3 -2  -1 -3 -5 0 
Percentage difference  -4 -6 -7 -7  -1 -5 -6 0 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on NRA and CTE estimates in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) and elasticity estimates 
in Tyers and Anderson (1992, Appendix Tables A2 to A4).1 
 
Appendix Table 1. Nominal Rates of Assistance of Policies Assisting Producers of 28 
Covered Farm Products, All 75 Focus Countries, 1960 to 2004 (percent) 
    1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
Grains and tubers  20 15  9 9 -1 25 20 14 17
Rice  39  6 11 12 -10 26 25 23 39
Wheat  15 22  7 2 9 30 23 12  6
Maize  4 8 5 2 -3 11 3 6 7
Cassava  0  0 -3 1 1 -1 -2 -4 -3
Barley  40 38 23 33 10 85 73 20  2
Sorghum  61 56 47 17 14 24 11 12  9
Millet  -19 -6 -4 -1 1 0 1 -3 -2
Oat  38 52 33 69 12 54 45 28  0
Oilseeds  -3 2  -3 -7 -2 10 8 2 1
Soybean  0 1 0 -2 -1 -2 1 7 4
Groundnut  -21  2 -14 -27 -1 34 3 -10 -14
Palmoil  -20 -24 -23 -15 -4 -5 8  -5  -3
Rapeseed  12 29 14 5 12 72 47  7 13
Sunflower  13  1  -9 -14 -23 46 19 -10 -12
Sesame  -53 -64 -65 -68 -60 -48 -46 -49 -39
Tropical crops  1 22 -8 -13 -10 0 3  9 21
Sugar  78  157 -4 9 15 38 28 39 60
Cotton  -10 0 9 -9 -12 -8 -10  -6 3
Coconut  -29 -24  -8 -3 -11 -19 -34 -22  -8
Coffee  -20 -31 -33 -43 -43 -31 -8 -10  0
Rubber  -16  -14  -8 -19 -19 -14 -16 5 4
Tea  -32 -31 -26 -26 -25 -24 -27 -19 -12
Cocoa  -27 -50 -45 -56 -47 -32 -32 -31 -35
Livestock products  38 41 36 48 29 39 33 28 25
Pigmeat  33 47 36 31 -16 -12 4 10 10
Milk  96 97 91 140 138 152 85 62 53
Beef  15 14 12 13 25 42 29 31 23
Poultry  21 20 26 26 29 20 26 20 19
Egg  -8 -3 -6 12 11 17 15 19  6
Sheepmeat  41 48 61 99 64 51 30 13 11
Wool  0 0 6 4 7 4 5 1 1
All of the above 
 28 commodities  
26 27 17 19 9 27 23 19 20
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on NRA estimates reported in national 
studies covering 75 focus countries. 
Note: The countries for which there are NRA (and CTE) estimates of these commodities 
account on average for 77 percent of global production (85 percent for grains, 74 percent 
for oilseeds, 74 percent for tropical crops, and 72 percent for livestock products).2 
 
Appendix Table 2. Consumer Tax Equivalents of Policies Assisting Producers of 28 
Covered Farm Products, All 75 Focus Countries, 1960 to 2004 (percent) 
    1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
Grains and tubers  23 7 1 7 4 20 15  10  13
Rice  42 -14 -11 4 1 24 25  22  38
Wheat  19  19 2 3 12 27 16 6 2
Maize  7 11  7 8 2 4 -3 -2 -2
Cassava  0 0  -1 -1 -2 -1 0 3 3
Barley  44 39 24 33 10 28 27 11  6
Sorghum  62 32 43 20 5 17 7 10  7
Millet  -15  -4  -2 0 2 3 4 6 6
Oat  39 54 33 68 11 24 17  4 -3
Oilseeds  -4  -2  -8 -8 0 3 2 4 2
Soybean  0 1  -3 -1 3 1 0 7 4
Groundnut  -21  -8 -20 -30 -7 26 -6 -12 -15
Palmoil  -19 -30 -35 -15 -7 -9 33  -2  -6
Rapeseed  3 13  7 5 9 13 15  5 11
Sunflower  10  1 -9 -17 -23 -2 -6 -5 -8
Sesame  -43 -56 -58 -61 -51 -38 -36 -40 -26
Tropical crops  28 56 -2 -2 -1 11 19 15 27
Sugar  116  175  1 13 19 38 42 44 63
Cotton  -8 0 3 -12 -15 -11 -18  -11  -6
Coconut  -29 -24  -9 -3 -12 -22 -36 -25 -10
Coffee  -16 -30 -30 -32 -49 -35 -18 -14  -4
Rubber  -43  -52  -6 -19 -23 -19 -11 2 1
Tea  -38 -41 -28 -26 -21 -21 -19 -21 -21
Cocoa  -28 -29 -33 -50 -43 -29 -19 -22 -31
Livestock products  41 43 37 49 31 39 28 26 24
Pigmeat  34 47 35 30 -12 -11 0  7  8
Milk  96 98 89 137 130 139 69 54 46
Beef  19 16 14 16 25 46 30 36 31
Poultry  24 23 28 27 28 17 21 18 19
Egg  -6 -1 -6 11 8 17 15 17  8
Sheepmeat  64 77  107 161 94 70 39 19 19
Wool  0 0 6 4 6 2 4 1 0
All of the above 
 28 commodities 
32 26 15 23 15 26 21 18 19
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on CTE estimates reported in national 
studies covering 75 focus countries. 3 
 
Appendix Table 3. Elasticities of Supply, 8 key Covered Products, Focus Countries 






bean  Sugar Wheat
Bangladesh na  na  na na na 0.74 na  0.51  0.67
China  na 0.16 0.80 0.60 0.60 0.12 na 0.88 0.10
India  na 0.21 0.15 na na 0.29 na 0.46 0.41
Indonesia na  0.22  na na 1.00 0.30 na  0.59  na
Korea  0.50 na  0.80 0.85 0.85 0.14 na na  0.55
Malaysia  na na na na na 0.08 na na na
Pakistan  na 0.19 0.34 na na 0.07 na 0.13 0.16
Philippines 0.50  0.40  na 1.04 1.04 0.26 na  0.68  na
Sri  Lanka  na na na na na 0.50 na na na
Taiwan  0.50 na  0.60 0.93 0.93 0.28 na na  0.49
Thailand na  0.46  na 0.91 0.91 0.40 na  1.50  na
Vietnam na  na  na 3.12 3.12 0.08 na  0.20  na
Cameroon na  0.40  na na na na na  na  na
Cote  d'Ivoire  na na na na na 0.50 na na na
Egypt  0.72 0.63 0.80 na na 0.20 na 0.32 1.08
Ethiopia na  0.40  na na na na na  na  0.50
Ghana na  0.40  na na na 0.50 na  na  na
Kenya na  0.40  na na na na na  0.51  0.50
Madagascar na  0.40  na na na 0.50 na  0.51  na
Mozambique na  0.40  na na na 0.50 na  0.51  na
Nigeria na  0.22  na na na 0.31 na  na  na
South Africa  0.72  0.60  na na 1.11 na na  0.30  0.66
Senegal  na na na na na 0.50 na na na
Sudan  0.60  na 0.60 na na na na 0.51 0.50
Tanzania na  0.40  na na na 0.50 na  0.51  0.50
Uganda na  0.40  na na na 0.50 na  0.51  na
Zambia na  0.40  na na na 0.50 na  na  0.50
Zimbabwe na  0.40  na na na na na  na  0.50
Argentina  0.72 0.60 0.40 na na na na  na 0.88
Brazil 0.80  0.90  na 0.91 0.91 0.75 na  0.80  0.90
Chile  0.60 0.59 0.30 na na na na 0.59 0.63
Colombia  0.60 0.59 0.30 na na 0.40 na 0.59 0.63
Dominican Rep.  na  na  na na 1.00 0.40 na  0.59  na
Ecuador 0.60  0.59  0.30 1.00 1.00 0.40 na  0.59  na
Mexico  0.46 0.60 0.50 0.90 0.90 0.93 na 0.45 0.84
Nicaragua 0.60  0.59  0.30 na 1.00 0.40 na  0.59  na
Continued over4 
 






bean  Sugar Wheat
Bulgaria  0.30 0.14 0.21 0.77 0.77 na na 0.08 0.08
Czech  Rep.  0.30  na 0.21 0.77 0.77 na na 0.08 0.08
Estonia  0.30 na  0.21 0.77 0.77 na na na  0.08
Hungary  0.30 0.14 0.21 0.77 0.77 na na 0.08 0.08
Kazakhstan  0.30  na 0.21 0.77 na na na 0.08 0.08
Latvia  0.30  na 0.21 0.77 0.77 na na 0.08 0.08
Lithuania  0.30  na 0.21 0.77 0.77 na na 0.08 0.08
Poland  0.30 0.14 0.21 0.77 0.77 na na 0.08 0.08
Romania  0.30 0.14 0.21 0.77 0.77 na na 0.08 0.08
Russia  0.52 0.27 0.30 1.12 1.12 na na 0.21 0.18
Slovakia  0.30 0.14 0.21 0.77 0.77 na na 0.08 0.08
Slovenia  0.30 0.14 0.21 0.77 0.77 na na 0.08 0.08
Turkey  0.30 0.14 0.21 na 0.77 0.40 na 0.08 0.08
Ukraine  0.30 0.14 0.21 0.77 0.77 na na 0.08 0.08
Australia  0.27 0.60 0.58 1.09 1.09 0.33 na 0.50 0.88
Austria  1.02 0.92 0.51 1.14 1.14 na na 0.50 0.90
Canada  0.60 0.68 0.50 0.89 0.89 na na  na 0.53
Denmark  1.02  na 0.51 1.14 1.14 na na 0.50 0.90
Finland  1.02  na 0.51 1.14 1.14 na na 0.50 0.90
France  1.02 0.92 0.51 1.14 1.14 0.40 na 0.50 0.90
Germany  1.02 0.92 0.51 1.14 1.14 na na 0.50 0.90
Iceland  0.69 na  0.51 1.50 1.50 na na na na
Ireland  1.02  na 0.51 1.14 1.14 na na 0.50 0.90
Italy  1.02 0.92 0.51 1.14 1.14 0.40 na 0.50 0.90
Japan  0.80  na 0.80 0.99 0.99 0.20 na 0.50 0.60
Netherlands  1.02 0.92 0.51 1.14 1.14 na na 0.50 0.90
New  Zealand  0.20 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.60 na na  na 0.93
Norway  0.69 na  0.51 1.50 1.50 na na na  0.90
Portugal  0.70 0.90 0.39 0.99 0.99 0.40 na 0.70 0.91
Spain  0.70 0.90 0.39 0.99 0.99 0.40 na 0.70 0.91
Sweden  1.02  na 0.51 1.14 1.14 na na 0.50 0.90
Switzerland  0.69 0.91 0.51 1.50 1.50 na na 0.32 0.90
UK  1.02  na 0.51 1.14 1.14 na na 0.50 0.90
US  0.72 0.75 0.85 1.12 1.12 0.75 na 0.28 0.80
Source: Tyers and Anderson (1992, Appendix Tables A2 to A4). 5 
 
Appendix Table 4. Elasticities of Demand, 8 key Covered Products, Focus Countries 




bean  Sugar Wheat
Bangladesh  na  na  na na na -0.30 na -1.00 -0.40
China  na -0.30 -2.00 -1.00 -1.00 -0.20 na -1.50 -0.30
India  na -0.35 -1.00 na na -0.40 na -0.80 -0.40
Indonesia  na -0.35  na na -1.40 -0.51 na -1.20  na
Korea  -1.20 na  -0.80 -1.50 -1.50 -1.18 na na  -0.36
Malaysia  na na na na na -0.20 na na na
Pakistan  na -0.35 -1.00 na na -0.35 na -1.00 -0.40
Philippines  -0.80 -0.25  na -0.50 -0.50 -0.42 na -1.40  na
Sri  Lanka  na na na na na -0.20 na na na
Taiwan  -1.50 na  -1.00 -0.80 -0.80 -0.20 na na  -0.36
Thailand  na -0.40  na -1.40 -1.40 -0.05 na -0.70  na
Vietnam  na na na -1.40 -1.40 -0.20 na  -1.00 na
Cameroon  na  -0.85 na na na na na na na
Cote  d'Ivoire  na na na na na -0.90 na na na
Egypt  -1.30 -0.50 -0.80 na na -0.60 na -0.80 -0.65
Ethiopia  na -0.85  na na na na na  na -1.20
Ghana  na  -0.85 na na na -0.90 na na na
Kenya  na -0.85  na na na na na -0.80 -1.20
Madagascar  na -0.85  na na na -0.90 na -0.80  na
Mozambique  na -0.85  na na na -0.90 na -0.80  na
Nigeria  na  -0.80 na na na -0.61 na na na
South  Africa  -1.00 -0.30  na na -1.20 na na -0.60 -0.30
Senegal  na na na na na -0.90 na na na
Sudan  -1.40  na -0.80 na na na na -0.80 -1.20
Tanzania  na -0.85  na na na -0.90 na -0.80 -1.20
Uganda  na -0.85  na na na -0.90 na -0.80  na
Zambia  na -0.85  na na na -0.90 na  na -1.20
Zimbabwe  na -0.85  na na na na na  na -1.20
Argentina  -0.40 -0.50 -0.80 na na na na  na -0.30
Brazil  -0.70 -0.70  na -0.90 -0.90 -0.70 na -0.60 -0.30
Chile  -0.80 -0.40 -0.80 na na na na -0.60 -0.45
Colombia  -0.80 -0.40 -0.80 na na -0.70 na -0.60 -0.45
Dominican  Rep.  na na na na -1.00 -0.70 na  -0.60 na
Ecuador  -0.80 -0.40 -0.80 -1.00 -1.00 -0.70 na -0.60  na
Mexico  -1.16 -0.85 -0.50 -1.20 -1.20 -0.50 na -0.85 -0.35
Nicaragua  -0.80 -0.40 -0.80 na -1.00 -0.70 na -0.60  na
Continued over6 
 




bean  Sugar Wheat
Bulgaria  -0.50 -0.20  0.00 -0.75 -0.75 na na -0.80 -0.20
Czech  Rep.  -0.50  na  0.00 -0.75 -0.75 na na -0.80 -0.20
Estonia  -0.50 na  0.00 -0.75 -0.75 na na na  -0.20
Hungary  -0.50 -0.20  0.00 -0.75 -0.75 na na -0.80 -0.20
Kazakhstan  -0.50  na  0.00 -0.75 na na na -0.80 -0.20
Latvia  -0.50  na  0.00 -0.75 -0.75 na na -0.80 -0.20
Lithuania  -0.50  na  0.00 -0.75 -0.75 na na -0.80 -0.20
Poland  -0.50 -0.20  0.00 -0.75 -0.75 na na -0.80 -0.20
Romania  -0.50 -0.20  0.00 -0.75 -0.75 na na -0.80 -0.20
Russia  -0.30 -0.15 -0.50 -0.70 -0.70 na na -0.10 -1.00
Slovakia  -0.50 -0.20  0.00 -0.75 -0.75 na na -0.80 -0.20
Slovenia  -0.50 -0.20  0.00 -0.75 -0.75 na na -0.80 -0.20
Turkey  -0.50 -0.20  0.00 na -0.75 -0.70 na -0.80 -0.20
Ukraine  -0.50 -0.20  0.00 -0.75 -0.75 na na -0.80 -0.20
Australia  -0.63 -0.30 -0.20 -1.00 -1.00 -0.40 na -0.18 -0.15
Austria  -0.60 -0.20 -0.40 -0.90 -0.90 na na -0.12 -0.30
Canada  -0.65 -0.20 -0.40 -0.75 -0.75 na na  na -0.18
Denmark  -0.60  na -0.40 -0.90 -0.90 na na -0.12 -0.30
Finland  -0.60  na -0.40 -0.90 -0.90 na na -0.12 -0.30
France  -0.60 -0.20 -0.40 -0.90 -0.90 -0.80 na -0.12 -0.30
Germany  -0.60 -0.20 -0.40 -0.90 -0.90 na na -0.12 -0.30
Iceland  -0.70 na  -0.20 -0.70 -0.70 na na na na
Ireland  -0.60  na -0.40 -0.90 -0.90 na na -0.12 -0.30
Italy  -0.60 -0.20 -0.40 -0.90 -0.90 -0.80 na -0.12 -0.30
Japan  -1.00  na -0.80 -1.40 -1.40 -0.18 na -0.05 -0.60
Netherlands  -0.60 -0.20 -0.40 -0.90 -0.90 na na -0.12 -0.30
New  Zealand  -0.60 -0.15 -0.20 -0.80 -0.80 na na  na -0.15
Norway  -0.70 na  -0.20 -0.70 -0.70 na na na  -0.42
Portugal  -0.90 -0.30 -0.60 -0.70 -0.70 -0.50 na -0.24 -0.42
Spain  -0.90 -0.30 -0.60 -0.70 -0.70 -0.50 na -0.24 -0.42
Sweden  -0.60  na -0.40 -0.90 -0.90 na na -0.12 -0.30
Switzerland  -0.70 -0.73 -0.20 -0.70 -0.70 na na -0.12 -0.42
UK  -0.60  na -0.40 -0.90 -0.90 na na -0.12 -0.30
US  -0.50 -0.20 -0.30 -0.80 -0.80 -0.20 na -0.20 -0.12




1 The Anderson and Neary (2005) trade restrictiveness index for a country (which they 
call a TRI) is similar to our GWRI measure for a global commodity market, while their 
mercantilist trade restrictiveness index (MTRI) for a country is similar to our GTRI 
measure for a global commodity market. Neither the measures in this paper, nor those in 
Anderson and Neary’s work, are indexes in the true sense of the word but rather uniform 
welfare- or trade-equivalent tariffs which allow for a theoretically correct ranking of the 
aggregate welfare- and trade-distorting effects of different policies across countries or 
across commodity markets. 
2 That is, we ignore indirect effects of sectoral and trade policy measures directed at non-
agricultural sectors. We also adopt the standard assumptions in basic trade theory that 
there are no divergences between private and social marginal costs and benefits that 
might arise from externalities, market failures, and any other behind-the-border policies 
not represented in our analysis, including such things as underinvestment in public goods. 
3 With linear demand and supply curves for a global commodity market in aggregate, this 
equates to an assumption that the aggregate demand and supply curves have the same 
slope, so that each side of the market contributes equally to the GTRI. 